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CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES IN THE CIVIL COURTS
T HE EXTENT to which civil courts may assume jurisdiction of ecclesias-
tical matters in church property disputes1 was involved in the North
Carolina case of Reid v. Johnston.2 There, a Baptist church, organized
in 1894, -received land on a conveyance which attached no doctrinal
limitations to its use. In 1953, a new pastor, supported by a majority
of the congregation, led a movement to withdraw from the Southern
Baptist Convention5 and to establish an Independent Missionary Baptist
Church. A dissident minority, seeking to frustrate this proposed plan,
however, brought an action in ejectment to determine which faction
should be entitled to control the church property.
The court classified the church as an independent, self-governing
body, but announced that the defendant-majority had so far departed
1 67 HARV. L. REV. 91 (-953). Notes, 39 MIcH. L. REV. 1040 094-1) 4 U. PlaT.
L. REV. 76 (1937) ; I SYRACUSE L. REV. 484 (1950). "The fact of conflict between
the rules and regulations of the . . . church and the laws of the state in this regard
remains. It is idle to dispute such fact; it is too patent to be questioned .... " Mazaika
v. Krauczunas, 233 Pa. 138, 152, 81 AUt. 938, 943 (1911).
2 24-x N.C. 2ox, 85 S.E.ad 114 (954). Notes, 54 MIcH. L. REv. ,o2 (1955) ; 7
S.C.L.Q. 670 (19s).
2 The grantor conveyed by deed to named trustees and their successors one quarter
acre of land which is the present site of the North Rocky Mount Baptist Church. The
deed provided that the trustees should hold such land "for the especial use and behoof
and benefit" of this church. In 2949 a lot on which the church parsonage is now lo-
cated was conveyed to the trustees likewise with no express limitation. Total real and
personal property of the church has a fair market value of from $25o,ooo to $300,000.
Id. at 207, 85 S.E.2d at 9ig.
'The vote was 241 in favor of the plan, 144 opposed; and 2oo abstained from
voting.
' The Southern Baptist Convention was formed on May 8, 1845. Its purpose as
stated in Article ix of the Convention Constitution, is "To provide a general organiza-
tion for Baptists in the United States for the promotion of Christian missions at home
and abroad and any other objects such as Christian education, benevolent enterprises and
social services which it may deem proper and advisable for the furtherance of the King-
dom of God." 1955 Annual of the Southern Baptist Convention 22. This broad pur-
pose does not evince any effort to establish basic doctrines or beliefs to which its members
churches must adhere. "Each church is autonomous or self-determining in all matters
pertaining to its own life and activities. It is not subject to any other church or body
of any kind whatsoever, but only to Christ and His authority .... Churches may seek
to fulfill their obligation to extend Christ's kingdom by cooperating with these general
organizations, but always on a purely voluntary basis, without surrendering in any way
their right to self-determination." 1928 Proceedings, Southern Baptist Convention 32-
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from Baptist principles as to lose its right to control the property. The
decision pointed to the fact that the majority, in addition to the with-
drawal from the Southern Baptist Convention, was discontinuing the
use of Southern Baptist Sunday school materials, suspending financial
aid to various Baptist ecumenical endeavors, discharging Sunday school
teachers, and giving the pastor sole control of the pulpit.'
One characteristic feature of the separation of church and state has
been the recognition by the civil courts that they have no jurisdiction
over ecclesiastical matters in church property disputes, except in so far
as it is necessary to decide an ecclesiastical question in determining who
has the right of control.7  There still arises, however, some difficulty in
defining the circumstances under which exercise of even this limited
ecclesiastical jurisdiction is proper.
The difficulty has been rather easily resolved by the courts in two
classes of cases. Where the church involved is part of a hierarchical
body with centralized control, the established ecclesiastical tribunal will
finally determine all doctrinal dissensions." The civil courts in such
cases are plainly precluded from any exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction,
' The court said that only those members of a congregation who adhere to the
"characteristic doctrines, usages, customs and practices of that particular church," ac-
cepted by both factions before the dissension arose can constitute the true congregation,
even though that group be a minority. Reid v. Johnston, 241 N.C. 201, 207, 85 S.E.2d
114, 1 x 8 (1954). This determination, unfortunately, requires the court to define exactly
what these doctrines are-not a simple task in congregational churches, where no una-
nimity of opinion exists, and in which each church has much freedom to define with par-
ticularity what what their individual beliefs should be.
'In Elston v. Wilborn, 208 Ark. 377, 378, 186 S.W.zd 662, 663 (1945) it was
stated, "1[T] he courts have steadily asserted their refusal to determine any controversy
relating purely to ecclesiastical or spiritual features of a church or religious society.
The courts intervene only to protect the temporalities of such bodies, and to determine
property rights." See also, Watson v. Jones, go U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (.892) ; Parker
v. Harper, 295 Ky. 686, 175 S.W.2d 361 (1943); Bray v. Moses, 305 Ky. 24, 202
S.W.zd 749 (1947) ; Calvary Baptist Church of Port Huron v. Shay, 292 Mich. 517,
z9o N.W. 890 (940) i U.S. CONST. amend. I; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 26 (sS68).
'The leading case establishing this rule is Watson v. Jones, 8o U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,
727 (872), wherein the Supreme Court said, "[W]henever the question of discipline,
or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of
these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must
accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them. . . . See also Trinity Methodist
Episcopal Church v. Harris, 73 Conn. 216, 47 At. xi6 (goo); Mack v. Kime, x29
Ga. 1, 58 S.E. 584 (1907) (Presbyterian) ; First Presbyterian Church v. First Cumber-
land Presbyterian Church, 245 UL. 74, 91 N.E. 761 (go) ; O'Donovan v. Chatard,
97 Ind. 421 (1884) (Roman Catholic) 5 Braun v. Clark, xoz Tex. 323, 116 S.W. 360
(19o9) (Presbyterian).
NOTES
and are limited to enforcing the property rights already determined on
doctrinal grounds by the church courts.'
A second group of cases is characterized by an original conveyance to
an independent and autonomous church, but with the express limitation
that the property only be used to perpetuate the religious doctrines of
that denomination. 10 Such a conveyance is usually held to create an
express trust; 1 and the courts, in order to give effect to the explicit
intent of the grantor, must exert ecclesiastical jurisdiction to decide which
faction still adheres to these doctrines. 2
The Johnston case, however, does not fall into either of the above
two classes, but rather is typical of a third. This group includes cases in
which independent, congregational churches, have received their prop-
erty free of any express doctrinal limitations. The announced rule for
deciding a dispute between factions of these self-governing churches is
that the will of the majority controls, but only so long as there is no
fundamental divergence from the faith, usages, and customs of the par-
ticular denomination.'8
' In O'Donovan v. Chatard, 97 Ind. 421 (i868), the court held that it was without
jurisdiction in a damage suit brought by a Roman Catholic priest against the bishop for
removing him from office, as jurisdiction in these matters remained entirely within
Roman Catholic ecclesiastical authority.
10 Of course, the original grant does not usually convey all of the church property,
but conveys only the land on which the church is to be erected5 or, perhaps the original
grant is a large sum of money which establishes the foundation from which the church
grows by later contributions. It is obvious that most of these later gifts are unrestricted
by the express doctrinal limitations attached to the major donation. However, the courts
have never applied a different set of rules to each type of gift. Perhaps such uniform
treatment may be justified on the theory that, since the restricted property constitutes the-
foundation of the organization, the restrictions extend by necessary implication to the
later grants.
"[ Aln individual ...may dedicate property by way of trust to the purpose of
sustaining, supporting, and propagating definite religious doctrines or principles ...
And it would seem also to be the obvious duty of the court . . . to see that the property
is not diverted from the trust which is thus attached to its use. . . . This is the general
doctrine of courts of equity as to charities, and it seems equally applicable to ecclesiasti-
cal matters." Watson v. Jones, So U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 7z3 (872). See also Smith
v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361, 33 N.E. 777 (1893) ; Park v. Champlin, 96 Iowa 55, 64 N.W.
674 (1895) ; Baptist Church v. Whitmore, 83 Iowa 138, 49 N.W. 81 (1891).
"' Failure to effectuate the grantor's expressed doctrinal intent would subject the
property to a claim of defeasance by the grantor's heirs on the ground that the grant
created a defeasible fee. This problem seldom arises, however, since such disputes are
resolved in favor of the group adhering to the doctrines expressd in the original con-
veyance. See note ii supra.
"' This formula has consistently been held to require that such divergencies must be
so drastic as to amount to something approaching a change in denomination. Mere
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The application of this limitation on majority control," however,
involves certain conceptual difficulties. If civil courts are limited by the
rule that they have no jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters except in
so far as is necessary to decide property rights,15 then upon what legal
basis can they rest the fundamental divergence rule?"0
The express trust cases' 7 suggest an implied trust theory as the legal
justification for the civil courts' jurisdiction in such cases, and this im-
internal disputes concerning shades of theological opinion wil not suffice. "[A] ma-
jority in a Baptist Church is supreme ...so long as it remains a Baptist Church or
true to the fundamental usages, customs, doctrine, practice, and organization of Bap-
tists." Dix v. Pruitt, 194 N.C. 64, 69, 138 S.E. 412, 415 (1927); "It is familiar law
that where factional differences occur in an ecclesiastical body, the rule of the civil
courts ... is to give effect to the will of that part of the organization acting in harmony
with the ecclesiastical laws, usages, customs, and principles which were accepted among
them before the dispute arose." Skyline Missionary Baptist Church v. Davis, 245 Ala.
455, 457, 17 So.2d 533, 535 (1944); Highland View Baptist Church v. Walker, 259
Ala. 3ox, 66 So.2d X22 (1953); Hughes v. Grossman, 166 Kan. 325, 201 P.zd 670
(949); Wheeless v. Barrett, 229 N.C. 282, 49 S.E.zd 629 (1948). But cf., "A Baptist
church is a pure democracy, and in all matters relating to its government, election of its
officers, its articles of faith, and the management of its affairs the local congregation
present and voting at a meeting regularly held, on any question, determines the matter
finally. . . . From the determination of a question by a majority of the congregation
there is no appeal to any ecclesiastical authority. A Baptist congregation, as long as it
acts as a local church functioning under its own laws and regulations, may say to all
mankind that, 'Mine are the gates to open and mine are the gates to close.' No power
may interfere with the authority of the local congregation so exercised." Thomas v.
Lewis, 224 Ky. 307, 33, 6 S.W.2d 255, 258 (198) ; First Baptist Church of Paris
v. Fort, 93 Tex. 215, 54 S.W. 89z (1900).
1" This limitation probably reflects a judicial determination, prompted by cases in-
volving more basic changes [e.g. Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9 (x868) (majority aban-
doned faith in Christ as the Messiah) ; Mt. Zion Baptist "Church v. Whitmore, 83 Iowa
138, 49 N.W. 81 (189x) (Majority adopted doctrine of "Sinless Perfection" and voted
the opposing minority out of the church); Dix v. Pruitt, 194 N.C. 64, 138 S.E. 412
(1927) (attempt to receive members without baptism or profession of faith)], that the
majority of a congregational church should not be allowed unrestrained control of
freely given church property. Otherwise, there is the possibility that the courts would
have to support a decision by a narow majority vote in an independent church to deny
the divinity of Jesus.
x See text to note 7 supra.
It is consistently held that majority stockholders of a private corporation have a
duty to protect the minority interest. Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont
Coal Co., 64 F.zd 817 (4 th Cir. 1933). The courts, perhaps, feel justified in restricting
majority rule in private corporations on the theory that they are "creatures of the state."
But to depart from the professed doctrine of separation of church and state, the courts
must express some substantial legal basis on which to justify interposing their judgment
as to what are the fundamental doctrines of an independent church.
"7 See note xi supra.
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plied trust theory is the rationale announced in most decisions.18  It is
perhaps logically satisfying to the courts, because they can so easily en-
visage a desire of the grantors, though unexpressed, that the basic beliefs
of the church benefiting from their grant shall not be entirely foreign
to doctrines inspiring the grant.
In spite of this superficial appeal, however, in many fact situations
both the rationale and the application of this theory may be quite un-
supportable. In the unusual case when the grantor had any actual intent
at all, it is as likely as not that he desired the maintenance of a church
in which the majority would be free, at the most, to adapt to new re-
ligious doctrines, and, at the least, to associate with various ecclesiastical
organizations within the denomination. Moreover, the implied trust
theory is difficult to apply because, in the case of most churches, funda-
mental changes have been accepted without litigation subsequent to the
time of the original grant. As a result, the courts have split widely as
to whether to look to the doctrines prevailing when the property was
acquired,'" or to those generally accepted when the litigation arose.2 °
The former solution would frequently be satisfactory to neither faction;
and the latter might, conceivably, prevent the majority from reverting
to those very doctrines which inspired the grant.
Though a minimum judicial restriction on majority control of church
property may be proper, the courts should recognize the limited justi-
fication for their intervention. The Johnston case appears to have ex-
ceeded this justification by greatly extending prior cases which laid down
this "fundamental divergence" rule.2' The changes there adverted to
" Dix v. Pruitt, 194 N.C. 64, 138 S.E. 412 (1927); Highland View Baptist Church
v. Walker, 259 Ala. 3o, 66 So.2d 122 (953) 5 Western North Carolina Conference v.
Tally, 229 N. C. 1, 47 S.E.2d 467 (1948) ; Rimmer v. Austin, x91 Miss. 664, 4 So.2d
224 (i94z) i "The principle that the civil court will, even in the absence of an express
trust, recognize an implied trust arising from . .. the fundamental and characteristic
doctrines of the church as held at the time the property was acquired is well formu-
lated .... " Annot., 8 A.L.R. 98, 114 (1920). But cf. Watson v. Jones, 8o U.S. (13
Wall) 679, 725 (.87-). "There being no such trust imposed upon the property when
purchased or given, the court will not imply one .... "
"Apostolic Holiness Union of Post Falls v. Knudson, zi Idaho 589, 123 Pac. 473
(i912); Christian Church v. Church of Christ, 219 Ill. 503, 76 N.E. 703 (19o6);
White Lick Quarterly Meeting of Friends v. White Lick Quarterly Meeting of Friends,
89 Ind. 136 (1883) Peace v. First Christian Church, 2o Tex.Civ.App. 85, 48 S.W.
534 (s9s).
2' Schnorr's Appeal, 67 Pa. 138 (1870) ; Boyles v. Roberts, 22 Mo. 613, 121 S.W.
805 (i9o9); Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic All Saints Church v. Kedrovsky, 1i3
Conn. 696, 156 At. 688 (1931) ; Bose v. Christ, 193 Pa. 13, 44 Adt. 240 (899).
"' Previous decisions by this court and others had heretofore required changes of a
t9561 NOTES
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by the court are practices subject to wide variance among churches both
congregational and hierarchical in form, and are more akin to internal
business matters than to matters of fundamental faith and doctrines in
the Baptist church.22 It is submitted that the Johnston holding cannot
be followed without unduly restricting church management and obstruct-
ing normal religious growth. 3
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much deeper nature: Rock Dell Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Congregation v.
Mommsen, 174 Minn. 207, 219 N.W. 88 (1928) (attempted union between Lutheran
and another denomination); Dix v. Pruitt, %94 N.C. 64, 138 S.E. 412 (1977) (attempt
to receive members without baptistm or profession of faith) ; Mattson v. Saastamoinen,
168 Minn. 178, 2o9 N.W. 648 (1926) (majority controls on questions of business
matters or changes in conduct of worship) ; Bakos v. Takach, 14 Ohio App. 370 (19I)
(attempt to change denomination).
" Not one of the departures desired by the majority, discussed in the text to note 6,
supra, represents a fundamental departure from Baptist tenets. As to every one of these
matters, there is wide divergence among the churches presently comprising the Southern
Baptist Convention. Even in churches with ecclesiastical courts, such as the Presby-
terian and Methodist, there is no complete uniformity in the use of Sunday school mate-
rials, hymn books, etc. The North Carolina court, in addition, held that if this church
carried out its plan to affiliate with the General Association of Regular Baptist Churches,
it would actually be changing denominations. The only support adduced for this
proposition was that the General Association adhered to the doctrine of premillennialism.
The court neglected to consider that a majority in any Baptist church is free to choose
between premillennialism and postmillennialism, and that the churches in the Southern
Baptist Convention are, in fact, widely split on this question. Furthermore, an examina-
tion of the Articles of Faith of the General Association of Regular Baptist Churches
reveals that any individual Baptist church could join the organization without a funda-
mental change in tenets. It is startling for the court to class any of these changes as
fundamental when the Southern Baptist Convention, itself, has no Articles of Faith
announcing its fundamental tenets. Even more startling, however, has been the subse-
quent denunciation by the Southern Baptist Convention of the testimony given by the wit-
nesses for the plaintiff-minority.
" The logical extereme of this decision would result in the civil courts usurping
from the majority in independent churches the determination of what are their funda-
mental religious beliefs. The possibility of such a result was foreseen in Watson 'V.
Jones, 8o U.S. 03 Wall.) 679, 733-34 (872), where the Court said, "But it is easy
to see that if civil courts are to inquire into all these matters, the whole subject of the
doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organiza-
tion of every religious denomination may, and must, be examined into with minuteness
and care, for they would become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the validity
of the ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil court. This principle would
deprive these bodies of the right of construfng their own church laws, would open the
way to all the evils which we have depicted as attendant upon the doctrine of Lord
Eldon, and would, in effect, transfer to the civil courts where property rights were con-
cerned the decision of all ecclesiastical questions."
